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BANISHMENT IN GEORGIA: A NEW APPROACH 
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Cameron Carpino* 
CONTEMPORARY USE OF AN ANCIENT PUNISHMENT 
The word banishment conjures up images of kings, knights, and 
scepters. It is hard to imagine that such a seemingly quaint 
punishment would have contemporary relevance. However, in a few 
states in America, banishment is still used as a punishment for 
crime.1 The state of Georgia has recently attracted nationwide 
attention for its use of banishment.2 
An offender may be banished from a certain county or counties, or 
from an entire judicial circuit,3 which often comprises several 
counties.4 Many states prohibit banishment,5 focusing on its lack of 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Research Editor 2010-2011 Georgia State University Law Review. 
The author would like to thank Chittam Thakore, Kevin Bradberry, and most importantly, her family, 
especially Ruby Carpino. 
 1. See Vesna Jaksic, A New Type of Sentence for Criminal Offenders: Exile, BROWARD DAILY BUS. 
REV. (Mass.), Dec. 14, 2007, at 9 (banishing offenders from a Massachusetts county and noting that a 
New Hampshire court had also banished an offender); Milo Ippolito, Judge Rules: ‘Banned in 
Buckhead’, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 11, 2003, at B5; see, e.g., Cobb v. State, 437 So. 2d 1218 (Miss. 
1983) (banishing an offender from a Mississippi county). For an example of another country using 
banishment, see also Alistair Munro, Thug is Nicked Strolling Down Runway Drunk in Airport Alert, 
DAILY REC. (Glasgow, Scotland), Sept. 27, 2008, at 30, available at 2008 WLNR 18350062. 
 2. Russ Bynum, Giving Criminals the Boot—Georgia Prosecutor Favors Banishing Wrongdoers, 
N.J. REC., Oct. 22, 2001, at A4, available at 2001 WLNR 9646287 (“Nationwide, banishment—which 
used to be . . . popular . . . has pretty much vanished from the scene . . . . Probably there’s more 
[banishment] in Georgia than any other state.”). Most of the discussion relating to banishment in 
Georgia has been focused on the state’s aggressive sex offender legislation. For thorough coverage of 
this issue, see Jacqueline Canlas-LaFlam, Has Georgia Gone Too Far—or Will Sex Offenders Have To?, 
35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 309 (Winter 2008); Amanda West, The Georgia Legislature Strikes with a 
Vengeance! Sex Offender Residency Restrictions & the Deterioration of the Ex Post Facto Clause, 57 
CATH. U. L. REV. 239 (2007). For an interesting account of the personal experiences of one offender 
affected by the new Georgia sex-offender registry laws, see Lori Sue Collins, My Life Before and After 
HB 1059, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 501 (2007). 
 3. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-35 (2008). 
 4. See, e.g., Georgia County Selection Map, U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/maps/georgia_map.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2011). 
 5. See Peter D. Edgerton, Banishment and the Right to Live Where You Want, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1023, 1030 (2007). But see McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Conditions of 
probation that reduce the access to potential victims are reasonable.” (citing Carswell v. State, 721 
N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999))). 
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rehabilitative value6 and potentially damaging public policy 
implications,7 including “convict dumping.”8 However, while 
banishment has negative aspects, it still retains value as a penal tool, 
especially in domestic violence situations. 9 
Part I of this Note will discuss the history of banishment,10 
specifically the use of banishment in Georgia,11 and introduce the 
basic theories of domestic violence.12 Part II will analyze the 
strengths and weaknesses of banishment, focusing on where 
banishment is and is not effective in preventing crime. Finally, Part 
III of this Note will propose that banishment should be reserved for 
only the most egregious repeat domestic violence offenders through 
the use of a multi-factor approach.  
I.  UNDERSTANDING BANISHMENT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A.  Historical Context 
Banishment has been defined as “a punishment . . . that forces a 
criminal to leave a city, place, or state for a period of time.”13 Used 
as a punitive criminal measure since the formation of the United 
States,14 banishment has been considered an extreme punishment 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Joy Archer Yeager, The Propriety of Conditioning Parole on Defendant's Not Entering Specified 
Geographical Area, 54 A.L.R. 5TH 743 § 2(b) n.6 (1997) (citing McCreary v. State, 582 So. 2d 425 
(Miss. 1991)); see discussion infra Part II.A. 
 7. Crabtree v. State, 112 P.3d 618, 621 (Wyo. 2005); State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (N.C. 
1953) (“It is not sound public policy to make other states a dumping ground for our criminals.”); People 
v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1930). 
 8. Rick Hirsch, City Counterattacks for Convict Dumping, MIAMI HERALD, May 10, 1985, at 1C, 
available at 1985 WLNR 283387. 
 9. See, e.g., Houston County District Attorney, 5 Reasons for Banishment, 
http://www.houstonda.org/houston-county-law-school/5-reasons-for-banishment.html (last visited Mar. 
17, 2011) (“If Tom's main problem is that he harasses Suzy, and Suzy is glad to see him out of her hair 
by being banished, why not do that instead of prison?”). 
 10. See infra Part I.A.  
 11. See infra Part I.B–C. 
 12. See infra Part I.D. 
 13. Matthew D. Borrelli, Banishment: The Constitutional and Public Policy Arguments Against this 
Revived Ancient Punishment, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 469, 471 (2003). 
 14. Id. at 469. Banishment was also used in the ancient world. See United States v. Abushar, 761 
F.2d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Gerald R. Miller, Banishment—A Medieval Tactic in Modern 
Criminal Law, 5 UTAH  L. REV. 365, 365 (1957)); Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 
(W.D. Va. 1979); ROBERT FRANK MEIER, CRIME AND SOCIETY 356 (1989). 
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throughout history.15 Originally, the isolated nature of colonial 
villages and settlements made banishment a harsh sentence, as it was 
very difficult to relocate. If a person tried to join a new community 
without references, they would “likely be alienated and rejected.”16 
Banishment was only used for the worst offenders who were 
considered a continuing threat to society.17 For various kinds of 
crimes, public shaming through the stocks or whipping was also 
used.18 
B.  Uses of Banishment 
The use of banishment in Georgia dates back at least to 1782 when 
a statute that penalized treason was enacted.19 A subsequent statute 
passed in 1787 stated that “felons transported or banished from 
another state or . . . country could be arrested and removed beyond 
the limits of the state, not to return on penalty of death.”20 In 
contemporary times, banishment is typically used as a condition of 
probation or as a condition of a suspended sentence.21 In Georgia, the 
period of banishment cannot be unlimited,22 but courts have imposed 
as much as a fifty-year banishment sentence.23 While on probation, 
an offender does not have the same rights and expectations of 
                                                                                                                 
 15. ARTHUR SHAPIRO, EVERYBODY BELONGS: CHANGING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD 
CLASSMATES WITH DISABILITIES 146 (1999) (“[T]he severest form of punishment in ancient times was 
not execution but banishment.”); see, e.g., State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (N.C. 1953) (“Through 
the ages the lot of the exile has been hard.”); HERBERT L. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 282–83 (Peter Smith ed., Columbia Univ. Press1957) (1904). 
 16. Andrea E. Yang, Historical Criminal Punishments, Punitive Aims and Un-“Civil” Post-Custody 
Sanctions on Sex Offenders: Reviving the Ex Post Facto Clause as a Bulwark of Personal Security and 
Private Rights, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1299, 1308 (Spring 2007). 
 17. Id. at 1307–08. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 14–15 (1800) (quoting the Georgia law enacted in 1782 
which provided “that all . . . persons . . . [found guilty of treason] are banished from said state”). 
 20. United States v. Atienzo, No. 2:04-CR-00534 PGC, 2005 WL 3334758, at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 7, 
2005). 
 21. Sanders v. State, 577 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“Banishment is authorized in Georgia 
only as a reasonable condition of probation or suspension of a sentence.”). 
 22. See id.; Kerr v. State, 387 S.E.2d 355, 359 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
 23. Presha v. State, 469 S.E.2d 293, 294–95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); see also Adams v. State, 527 
S.E.2d 911, 912 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming a thirty year banishment); Edwards v. State, 327 S.E.2d 
559, 560–61 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming a ten year banishment). 
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freedom that a non-offender would have,24 so Georgia courts have 
resisted constitutional challenges to the reasonableness of banishment 
as well as attempts to classify it as cruel and unusual punishment 
under the state constitution.25 The Supreme Court of Georgia has also 
refused to prohibit banishment, noting: “[I]f it is to be absolutely 
prohibited, it must be done by the legislature.”26 
Banishment has been used for crimes such as drug possession or 
sale,27 burglary,28 stalking,29 assault30 or battery,31 child 
molestation,32 prostitution,33 and making terroristic threats to a 
judge.34 Some applications of banishment have allowed limited entry 
into prohibited areas, such as entry for child visitation,35 or with 
advance permission from the probation officer.36 The goals of 
banishment are to remove the offenders from the community and 
reduce the temptation to repeat their crimes.37 The Eleventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See Terry v. Hamrick, 663 S.E.2d 256, 260 (Ga. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 510 (2008); 
Goode v. Nobles, 518 S.E.2d 122, 123 (Ga. 1999) (quoting Staley v. State, 505 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1998)); see also People v. Smith, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 316, 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing a trial 
court decision finding no “valid basis for . . . ‘having a tight rein on someone who has been convicted 
[of a crime]’”); United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 751 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Such limitations are 
permitted because the probationers have been convicted of crimes and have thereby given the state a 
compelling interest in limiting their liberty in order to effectuate their rehabilitation and to protect 
society.” (quoting Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362,1367 (11th Cir. 1982))). But see Cross v. Huff, 67 
S.E.2d 124, 126 (Ga. 1951). 
 25. State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 473 (Ga. 1974) (quoting WALTER MCELREATH, A TREATISE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA 442 (1912)). 
 26. Id. at 473. 
 27. E.g., Adams, 527 S.E.2d at 912; Presha, 469 S.E.2d at 294. 
 28. E.g., Massey v. State, 493 S.E.2d 255, 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). 
 29. E.g., Williams v. State, 470 S.E.2d 922, 923–24 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
 30. E.g., Cobb v. State, 437 So. 2d 1218, 1219 (Miss. 1983); State v. Charlton, 846 P.2d 341, 342 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1992). 
 31. E.g., Dudley v. State, 496 S.E.2d 341, 342 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). 
 32. E.g., Phillips v. State, 512 S.E.2d 32, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Ardeneaux v. State, 484 S.E.2d 74, 
74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).  
 33. E.g., People v. Pickens, 542 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (banishing an offender from 
an area of the city where 95% of prostitution arrests occurred). 
 34. E.g., Kathy Jefcoats, Law & Order Clayton County: Man to be Banished for Threats to Judge, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 20, 2006, at C3. 
 35. McCreary v. State, 582 So. 2d 425, 426 (Miss. 1991) (banishing the offender from entire state 
indefinitely but permitting limited entry for child visitation). 
 36. United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 750 (11th Cir. 1988); Edwards v. State, 327 S.E.2d 559, 
560–61 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (learning his business had caught fire, defendant was allowed to reenter the 
prohibited county after obtaining his probation officer’s permission).    
 37. Cothran, 855 F.2d at 752; Shook v. State, 684 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); Wyche v. 
State, 397 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (banishing in this case “removes the offender from a 
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noted that banishment can provide the offender “[a] unique 
opportunity to start anew and break free of the environment and 
familiar influences which encouraged him to [commit crimes] in the 
first place.”38 Other states that have considered banishment have 
found it to be unlawful and without rehabilitative value to the 
offender.39 Although the views of the state courts are clear, the 
United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether banishment 
is illegal or violates the United States Constitution. 40 
In comparison to banishment, “deportation is used to remove 
aliens, not citizens, who commit crimes in the United States.”41 It has 
consistently been held as an illegal exercise of judicial power when 
used as punishment for a crime for citizens.42 The decision to deport 
someone properly belongs to federal immigration officials and cannot 
usually be ordered by criminal courts at the state level.43 While this 
Note is limited to requirements that the defendant leave the state or 
county, at least one state court has ordered that a defendant return to 
his home in another country while on probation.44  
                                                                                                                 
locale in which he previously succumbed to the temptation of drugs”). 
 38. Cothran, 855 F.2d at 752. 
 39. Yeager, supra note 6. 
 40. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 24, Terry v. Hamrick, 663 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. 2008) (No. 
S08A0170), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 510 (2008). 
 41. Borrelli, supra note 13, at 471; see also Sanchez v. State, 508 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1998) (citing United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 42. Sanchez, 508 S.E.2d at 186 (“8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) specifies removal or deportation 
proceedings under that section as the ‘sole and exclusive procedure’ for removing aliens from the 
United States.”) (emphasis added). But see Jennifer Lewington & Peter Cheney, Sentence for Sexual 
Abuse: Three Years' Exile in Canada, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Oct. 23, 2006, at A1, available 
at 2006 WLNR 18356092. 
 43. Sanchez, 508 S.E.2d at 186–87 (quoting United States v. Romeo, 122 F.3d 941, 943 (11th Cir. 
1997)). But see Lewington & Cheney, supra note 42. 
 44. See Lewington & Cheney, supra note 42 (discussing an American resident teacher who was 
exiled to Canada for having sexual contact with a student). But see In re Babak S., 18 Cal. App. 4th 
1077 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (invalidating a probation condition which required that the offender reside 
with relatives in Iran for the duration of his sentence). 
5
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C.  Banishment in Georgia 
1.  Statutory Sources 
Intrastate banishment in Georgia was authorized by the state 
Constitution as amended in 1877,45 which provides: “[B]anishment 
beyond the limits of the state . . . shall [not] be allowed as a 
punishment for crime.”46 Although the origins of this section are 
more than a century old, when a 1979 subcommittee meeting was 
held to revise other sections, the members, “unanimously agreed to 
leave that provision in its present form.”47 Courts have interpreted the 
explicit prohibition against interstate banishment to implicitly 
sanction intrastate banishment.48 The statutes in Georgia give judges 
latitude in fashioning sentences,49 but the banishment must not be 
“unreasonable or otherwise fail[ ] to bear a logical relationship to the 
rehabilitative scheme of the sentence pronounced.”50 Through the 
years, Georgia courts have consistently found that banishment is a 
reasonable condition of probation.51 Until recently, judges were 
permitted to banish an offender from any number of Georgia’s 
counties, including 158 of a total of 159 counties.52 In 2006, Georgia 
amended its probation statute53 to prohibit banishment to any area 
smaller than a single judicial circuit or to an area that does not have a 
service or program that the offender is required to participate in as a 
condition of his sentence.54 Although in most cases this amendment 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Borrelli, supra note 13, at 471. 
 46. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 3 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 47. Dorothy T. Beasely, The Georgia Bill of Rights: Dead or Alive?, 34 EMORY L.J. 341, 387–88 
(1985). 
 48. State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 473 (Ga. 1974). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Collett, 208 S.E.2d at 474; see also Shook v. State, 684 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) 
(citing Hallford v. State, 657 S.E.2d 10, 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)). The defendant has the burden to prove 
that the banishment condition is unreasonable. See Collett, 208 S.E.2d at 474; Presha v. State, 469 
S.E.2d 293, 294 (Ga Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). The Georgia Court of Appeals has also held that 
only the convicted person may be banished. Parkerson v. State, 274 S.E.2d 799, 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) 
(invalidating a probation condition that also banished the defendant’s wife). 
 51. Parkerson, 274 S.E.2d at 799 (citing Collett, 208 S.E.2d at 474). 
 52. Terry v. Hamrick, 663 S.E.2d 256, 257 (Ga. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 510 (2008). 
 53. Id. at 258 n.2; see also Brief of Respondent-Appellee at *20–21, Terry, 663 S.E.2d 256, (No. 
S08A0170). 
 54. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-35(a)(6) (2008). 
6
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enlarged the size of the restricted geographic area permitted,55 there 
are several single-county circuits in the state, including the Rome, 
Dougherty, and Eastern judicial circuits.56 
2.  Houston County: Banishment Capital of the State 
Although many counties in Georgia use banishment,57 Houston 
County, located in central Georgia,58 has earned a reputation for 
favoring banishment and using it often.59 Former Houston County 
District Attorney Kelly Burke has banished more than 400 defendants 
from the county.60 Offenders are banished for a wide variety of 
crimes, including shoplifting61 and forgery,62 but Burke notes that he 
primarily “requires” banishment in drug-related crimes.63 
                                                                                                                 
 55. The original text of Georgia Code section 42-8-35(a)(6) stated “[r]emain within a specified 
location,” and the 2006 amendment added the qualification: 
provided, however, that the court shall not banish a probationer to any area within the 
state: (A) That does not consist of at least one entire judicial circuit as described by Code 
Section 15-16-1;  or (B) In which any service or program in which the probationer must 
participate as a condition of probation is not available. 
2006 Ga. Laws 577, § 1 (as codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-35(a)(6) (2008)). 
 56. Georgia County Selection Map, supra note 4. 
 57. E.g., Shook v. State, 684 S.E.2d 129, 130 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (Union County); Terry, 663 
S.E.2d at 257 (Douglas County); Hallford v. State, 657 S.E.2d 10, 11 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (Richmond 
County); Adams v. State, 527 S.E.2d 911, 911 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (Chattooga County); Phillips v. 
State, 512 S.E.2d 32, 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (Bartow County); Massey v. State, 493 S.E.2d 255, 255 n.1 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (Thomas County); Ardeneaux v. State, 484 S.E.2d 74, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (Hall 
County); Presha v. State, 469 S.E.2d 293, 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (Thomas County); Whitehead v. 
State, 429 S.E.2d 536, 538 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (Lowndes County); Garland v. State, 286 S.E.2d 330, 
331 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (Grady County); Parkerson v. State,  274 S.E.2d 799, 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) 
(Charlton County); State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472 (Ga. 1974) (Cobb County); Jefcoats, supra note 34 
(Clayton County); Becky Purser, Rapist, Accused Killer Gets Life Term in Perry Trial, MACON TEL. 
(Ga.), Aug. 28, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 16772346 (Houston County); Amy Leigh Womack, 
Massage Parlor Worker Banned from Bibb, MACON TEL. (Ga.), July 22, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 
13926975 (Bibb County). 
 58. Georgia County Selection Map, supra note 4. 
 59. See Bynum, supra note 2;  Paul Kish & Carl Lietz, Banishment: Exile Permitted Under Current 
Georgia and Federal Criminal Law, GA. FED. CRIM. LAW. BLOG, July 24, 2009, 
http://www.georgiafederalcriminallawyerblog.com/2009/07/banishment_exile_permitted_in.html. 
 60. Houston County District Attorney, supra note 9. 
 61. E.g., Bynum, supra note 2. 
 62. Houston County Banishment Registry, http://public.houstonda.org/listallban.asp (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2010). 
 63. Houston County District Attorney, Banishment from Houston County, 
http://houstonda.org/houston-county-law-school/banishment-from-houston-county.html (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2011); see, e.g., Houston County District Attorney, Drug Dealing=12 Yrs Prison & 
Banishment, http://houstonda.org/houston-county-law-school/banishment-from-houston-county.html 
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D.  Domestic Violence Theories and Remedies 
Domestic violence is crime in which the offender and victim are 
part of the same household.64 In Georgia, these crimes are prosecuted 
under Code section 19-13-1, which defines domestic violence as  
the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between past 
or present spouses, persons who are parents of the same child, 
parents and children, stepparents and stepchildren, foster parents 
and foster children, or other persons living or formerly living in 
the same household: (1) Any felony; or (2) Commission of 
offenses of battery, simple battery, simple assault, assault, 
stalking, criminal damage to property, unlawful restraint, or 
criminal trespass.65 
In a domestic violence situation, the offender exerts control over his 
or her partner or family member, which results in physical, verbal, or 
emotional abuse.66 The pattern of violence tends to be cyclical,67 with 
a pattern of building tension leading to the attack, followed by a 
“honeymoon” period when the offender behaves well68 and gains the 
victim’s forgiveness.69 The most tragic result of domestic violence is 
                                                                                                                 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2011) (defendant banished from Houston and all surrounding counties). 
 64. Michele M. Hughes, Definitions, 28 C.J.S. Domestic Abuse and Violence § 1 (2010). The 
definition of what a household means and whom it encompasses varies by statute. Michelle M. Huges, 
Protected Persons, 28 C.J.S. Domestic Abuse and Violence § 7 ( 2010) (“Spouses, persons living as 
spouses, former spouses, or persons who lived as spouses, are family or household members within the 
meaning of domestic abuse and violence statutes. Under other statutory provisions, a household member 
also includes a person who regularly resides in the household or who, previously . . . regularly resided in 
the household. Under some authority the protections of a domestic abuse act extend to persons who are 
‘residing together’, whether they are involved in a sexual or romantic relationship or are just co-
residents.”) (footnotes omitted)). 
 65. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (2004). Family violence battery is not a separate crime. See William 
H. Lindsley, Family Violence Battery, 20 GA. JUR. Criminal Law § 6:44 (2010). 
 66. Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic 
Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2009) (quoting WomensLaw.org, What is Domestic 
Violence?, http://www.womenslaw.org/simple.php?sitemap_id=39#1 (last visited Mar. 16, 2011)). 
 67. Laura Beckerman, Book Note, A Typology of Domestic Violence: Intimate Terrorism, Violent 
Resistance, and Situational Couple Violence by Michael P. Johnson, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & 
JUST. 75, 77 (2009). 
 68. Cycle of Violence, DomesticViolence.org, http://www.domesticviolence.org/cycle-of-violence/ 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2011) (adapted from LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979)). 
 69. See Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for 
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murder-suicide, where the offender kills the victim and then 
himself.70 Because of the intimate relationship between perpetrators 
of family violence and victims, the category of potential victims is 
extremely small—compared to the general public—and the offender 
repeatedly abuses the same victim.71 Statistically, the vast majority of 
victims are women.72 
A protective order73 is a judicial tool often used in domestic 
violence situations. It limits or prohibits the offender from having 
contact with the victim74 and may authorize eviction of the offender 
from the family home.75 When the arrest or complaint is initially 
made, the victims may choose to file a temporary protective order.76 
This order lasts for one year unless extended or changed to a 
permanent order.77 Violation of the protective order is in itself an 
offense that may be cause for arrest;78 additionally, violations are 
often accompanied by acts of violence, which may provide a separate 
basis for arrest.79 
                                                                                                                 
Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 369–70 (1996). 
 70. Judith S. Kaye, Shaping State Courts for the New Century: What Chief Judges Can Do, 61 ME. 
L. REV. 356, 361 (2009) (“The domestic violence cases, too often begin[] with an assault . . . and end[] 
with a murder/suicide.”); Diane L. Rosenfeld, Correlative Rights and the Boundaries of Freedom: 
Protecting the Civil Rights of Endangered Women, 43 HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV.  257, 259 (2008) 
(“With distressing frequency, domestic violence ends, not in escape and reconstruction of the woman's 
life, but in murder or murder/suicide.”). 
 71. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 
343, 375 n.122 (2007) (citing Jeffery Fagan, Cessation of Family Violence: Deterrence and Dissuasion, 
11 CRIME & JUST. 377, 397 (1989) (“consistent finding that spousal abuse is often repeated”)). 
 72. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET. AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., No. NCJ 207846, FAMILY VIOLENCE 
STATISTICS: INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 10 (2005), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf (reporting that violent crimes committed between 1998–
2002 women victims comprised 73.4% of the family violence crimes). 
 73. A protective order is defined as “[a] court order prohibiting or restricting a party from engaging 
in conduct . . . that unduly . . . burdens [another] party.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (3d Pocket ed. 
2006). Georgia’s protective order statute is codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-13-3, -4 (2003). 
 74. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(9) (2004). 
 75. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(5) (2004). 
 76. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3 (2004). 
 77. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(c) (2004). 
 78. GA CODE ANN. § 19-13-6 (2004). 
 79. See, e.g., Terry v. Hamrick, 663 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. 2008), cert denied, 129 S.Ct. 510 (2008); 
Crabtree v. State, 112 P.3d 618, 619–20 (Wyo. 2005). 
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E.  Terry v. Hamrick 
Gregory Mac Terry’s case80 has attracted nationwide scrutiny and 
brought renewed interest in the issue of banishment.81 Terry had a 
history of violent behavior toward his ex-wife, and she had obtained a 
protective order against him.82 This order was in effect when he 
kidnapped and assaulted her.83 The case is noteworthy because Terry 
was banished from 158 of Georgia’s 159 counties for the kidnapping 
and assault.84 The only county in which Terry could lawfully be 
present was Toombs85—200 miles from his Douglas County home.86 
II.  BANISHMENT IN ACTION 
A.  Policy Concerns 
The most commonly cited reason for rejecting banishment is that it 
only shifts offenders to a different area, making them another 
jurisdiction’s problem.87 This phenomenon can provoke retaliation 
from neighboring areas.88 For example, Miami’s mayor announced a 
plan to sue Santa Monica, California for “dumping a convicted sex 
offender” in their city, after the California police provided the 
offender with a plane ticket to Miami.89 As noted in State v. 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Terry, 663 S.E.2d at 256. 
 81. See Jason S. Alloy, “158-County Banishment” in Georgia: Constitutional Implications Under 
the State Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel, 36 GA. L. REV. 1083 (2002). 
 82. Terry, 663 S.E.2d at 259. 
 83. Id. at 257, 259. 
 84. Id. at 257.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Paul Kish & Carl Lietz, Banishment: Exile Permitted Under Current Georgia and Federal 
Criminal Law, GA. FED. CRIM. LAW. BLOG, July 24, 2009, 
http://www.georgiafederalcriminallawyerblog.com/2009/07/banishment_exile_permitted_in.html.2009/0
7/banishment_exile_permitted_in.html. 
 87. Becky Purser, More Than 500 People Have Been Banished from Houston County, 
http://www.houstonda.org/local-headlines/more-than-500-people-have-been-banished-from-houston-
county.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2011) (“[W]holesale use of banishment would result in simply 
shuffling people around the state.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 8. 
 89. Id. The Chief of the Santa Monica Police Department bought a ticket to Miami for convicted 
rapist and child abuser Weston Hill. Id. Hill was subsequently arrested twice within two weeks. Id. In 
the past, other law enforcement agencies also sent convicts to Miami, some of whom were mentally 
challenged. Id. 
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Doughtie,90 this practice will not encourage positive relations within 
and among the states.91 
In some areas, instead of direct retaliation, the counties that end up 
with banished offenders start banishing as well.92 This phenomenon 
is happening in Bibb County, Georgia,93 which is directly adjacent to 
Houston County.94 Most recently, a sixty-four-year-old massage 
parlor worker was banished from Bibb and moved to Atlanta.95 In 
Dekalb County, Georgia, judges are banishing drug dealers from 
Dekalb and the surrounding counties,96 prompting the District 
Attorney in nearby Cherokee County97 to state: “We’ll return the 
favor.”98 
In addition, this problem is evident where an offender is banished 
from one place and later commits the same crime in the new area. In 
Krack v. State,99 a New Mexico pharmacist admitted to molesting 
children and was banished from the state as part of a “[p]re-
prosecution [d]iversion” plan.100 At his new home in Alaska, Krack 
used drugs to entice and molest numerous young boys.101 Krack’s 
                                                                                                                 
 90. State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (N.C. 1953) (invalidating a suspended two-year road 
sentence). 
 91. Crabtree v. State, 112 P.3d 618, 622 (Wyo. 2005); Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d at 924 (“It is not sound 
public policy to make other states a dumping ground for our criminals.”); People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 
96 (Mich. 1930); see also STEPHEN L. WASBY, CIVIL LIBERTIES: POLICY AND POLICY MAKING 115 
(Rowman & Littlefield 1977) (1976). 
 92. Celia Sibley, Dekalb DA Seeks Banishment: He Would Not Let Drug Dealers Return, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST., Dec. 17, 1998, at E, available at 1998 WLNR 3476022. 
 93. Celeste Smith, Woman's Sentence Includes Banishment from Bibb County, FOX 24 (Macon, Ga.), 
July 22, 2009, http://www.fox24.com/news/local/51394052.html?corder=regular. 
 94. Georgia County Selection Map, supra note 4. 
 95. Womack, supra note 57. 
 96. Sibley, supra note 92; Russ Bynum, Associated Press, Georgia Communities Put Criminals on 
First Bus Out of Town, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at 31, available at 2001 WLNR 10508982. Although 
banishment may seem like a tool mostly used in smaller, rural counties, an Atlanta City Court judge 
banished a man from the downtown Buckhead district due to misbehavior in the area bars and 
nightclubs. Ippolito, supra note 1. 
 97. Georgia County Selection Map, supra note 4. 
 98. Sibley, supra note 92. 
 99. Krack v. State, 973 P.2d 100 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). 
 100. Id. at 101, 105. 
 101. Id. A case similar to Krack is Phillips v. State, 512 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999), where the 
offender was sentenced to prison time and banishment for sodomy, child molestation, and sexual 
exploitation in 1990. Id. at 32–33. After being released from incarceration, Phillips violated his 
probation in 1994 by victimizing more children, and pled guilty to aggravated child molestation and 
eight counts of sodomy. Id. at 33. 
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abuse of local children continued for more than a decade.102 In 
Krack, there was no connection between the children and the 
offender—they were simply his preferred category of victims.103 
When choosing their victims, child molesters often identify children 
who appear vulnerable in some way;104 they do not select their 
victims based on existing social relationships. Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that Krack’s pattern of offense continued long after his 
banishment from New Mexico. 
There have also been allegations that some uses of intrastate 
banishment have been veiled attempts to exile the offender from the 
entire state.105 Before the Georgia statute was amended in 2006,106 
offenders were commonly banished from all but one county107—
generally rural and isolated Echols County.108 Many offenders, faced 
with the dim prospects available in such a small area,109 chose instead 
to leave the state,110often planning to relocate near family 
members.111 The result is that the offenders do not commit crimes in 
the state, but the state has no way to monitor their progress.112 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Krack, 973 P.2d at 101. Two of Krack’s victims committed suicide, one immediately after being 
contacted during the investigation of this case. Id. 
 103. Krack’s targeted victims in both New Mexico and Alaska were young boys. Id. 
 104. See John B. Murray, Psychological Profile of Pedophiles and Child Molesters, 134 J. PSYCHOL. 
211, 219 (2000). 
 105. See, e.g., Terry v. Hamrick, 663 S.E.2d 256, 258 (Ga. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 510 (2008). 
 106. See supra note 55. 
 107. Brenden Sager, Banished Vanish at Georgia ‘Gulag’: Echols County Prisoners Simply Flee 
State, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 30, 2001, at C1; see, e.g., Terry, 663 S.E.2d at 258. 
 108. Sager, supra note 107; Terry Dickson, Don't Ruin Echols' Slice of Heaven, FLA. TIMES-UNION, 
Jan. 9, 2008, at B1. However, at least one court has affirmed banishment from every county but Echols, 
although the amended statute requires that the area be no smaller than a judicial circuit. Robbins v. 
Smith, No. 1:08-CV-1351-TWT, 2009 WL 3158177, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 109. Sager, supra note 107, at C1 (“There are no restaurants, hotels or banks. There is [only] one 
traffic light . . . [and] no incorporated town [in Echols].”). 
 110. Sager, supra note 107, at C8. Despite the fact that Dekalb County has banished over 200 
offenders to Echols County, the Sheriff stated in 2001 that no offenders had ever reported there. Sager, 
supra note 107, at C8. But in 2008, a man did present himself at the Sheriff’s Office, stating that his 
probation officer sent him to live in Echols. Dickson, supra note 108. The Sheriff called the banishing 
court, stating that he “didn’t want riffraff banished here from another court.” Dickson, supra note 108. 
For more on the community reaction to banished offenders being sent to Echols County see Lindsay 
Isaacs, Rural County Baffled by Judges' Punishment, AM. CITY & COUNTY (Nov. 2001) available at 
http://americancityandcounty.com/mag/government_qarural_county_baffled/. 
 111. Sager, supra note 109, at C8. 
 112. State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (N.C. 1953). 
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One of the most commonly cited weaknesses of banishment is a 
lack of rehabilitative value113 because relocating the offender does 
not provide them with any tools to avoid reoffending. As illustrated 
by Krack,114 the offender simply arrives in a new place and remains a 
continuing threat to the community.115 With the amendments to the 
Georgia statute concerning banishment,116 the legislature is 
attempting to ensure that banished offenders receive the services they 
need and will therefore be less prone to reoffend. 
Banishment also removes offenders from any family structure or 
support system they may have.117 Taking away that lifeline 
potentially makes it even more difficult for most offenders to make 
better choices in their lives.118 However, as former Houston County 
District Attorney Kelly Burke has noted, the offender was engaged in 
criminal activity, so the family network had clearly not been effective 
thus far.119 
One of the main goals of banishment is to separate the offender 
from the environment and people that influenced him to commit a 
crime.120 In some cases, particularly with younger,121 non-repeat 
offenders, this could potentially be effective.122 By distancing the 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Yeager, supra note 6. 
 114. See supra notes 99–103. 
 115. In contrast, domestic violation sentencing often includes mandated batterer intervention classes 
aimed at resolving the causes of violence, including aggression, jealousy, poor parenting skills, and low 
self-esteem. Larry W. Bennett & Oliver J. Williams, Intervention Programs for Men Who Batter, in 
SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 261, 263 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001); Alan 
Rosenbaum & Penny Leisring, Group Intervention Programs for Batterers, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
OFFENDERS: CURRENT INTERVENTIONS, RESEARCH, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICIES AND STANDARDS 
57, 58–63 (Robert A. Geffner & Alan Rosenbaum eds., 2001). 
 116. See supra note 55. 
 117. Purser, supra note 87. 
 118. Id. (“[B]anishment may set up an offender for failure when the justice system should encourage 
success.”). 
 119. Burke, supra note 9. 
 120. See sources cited supra note 37. 
 121. See, e.g., Eric Stirgus, Clayton Tries to Evict Troublesome Teens, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 18, 
2006, at A1 (referencing a Clayton County juvenile court judge who banished a fifteen year-old girl 
from the subdivision where she was temporarily living with a relative because she beat up another teen). 
 122. Debra Carlton Harrell, Tlingit Man Says He’s Transformed After Year Alone: The Lessons of 
Banishment, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 15, 1998, at A1, available at 1998 WLNR 1996655. 
After pleading guilty to assault and robbery at age sixteen, a tribal court in Washington sentenced the 
offender to eighteen months banishment on several remote Alaskan islands with minimal provisions. Id.  
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offender from the “wrong crowd”123 they have been associating with 
(often the complaint of parents),124 the temptation to reoffend would 
theoretically be reduced.125 
Banishment is often used in offenses involving sale or possession 
of drugs.126 The goal is to separate the offender from his customers or 
the dealers he usually purchases from, which would theoretically 
make it difficult for him to restart his criminal enterprise without 
those connections.127 However, to a possibly unemployed offender in 
a new place, selling drugs loses none of its original attractiveness—
fast, easy money with little effort.128 
Similarly, the offenders banished for drug possession who have a 
genuine addiction problem will not be helped by this “geographic 
cure.”129 Although criminals convicted of drug crimes are often 
touted as the ideal candidates for banishment,130 the supporting 
arguments fail to withstand critical scrutiny. The public will likely 
support banishment to rid their community of drug problems,131 but 
banishment is not an effective approach in these cases. 
                                                                                                                 
 123. RICHARD M. LERNER, THE GOOD TEEN: RESCUING ADOLESCENCE FROM THE MYTHS OF THE 
STORM AND STRESS YEARS 6 (2007). 
 124. JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOLESCENCE 375 (2007). One 
of the main purposes of probation, where banishment is often included, is to distance the offender from 
criminal temptations or undesirable influences. Inman v. State, 183 S.E.2d 413, 415 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1971). 
 125. ROBERT V. HECKEL & DAVID M. SHUMAKER, CHILDREN WHO MURDER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE, at xvi (2001) (“The juvenile justice system has a much higher rate of success than the 
adult correctional system.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 527 S.E.2d 911, 912 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Presha v. State, 469 S.E.2d 
293, 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
 127. Burke, supra note 9. 
 128. Peter Duffy, Life of Crime, and Time Behind Bars, Inspire a Drug Dealer to Turn Author, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A24; Dominic Ippolito, My Life as a Drug Dealer, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 2005, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2005/07/31/my-life-as-a-drug-dealer.html. In addition, it seems unlikely that 
the new area would be devoid of a supply of customers, given the drug problem Georgia is currently 
facing, especially with methamphetamine. EDWARD WILLETT, SPEED 29–30 (2008); HERBERT C. 
COVEY, THE METHAMPHETAMINE CRISIS: STRATEGIES TO SAVE ADDICTS, FAMILIES, AND 
COMMUNITIES 36–37 (2007). 
 129. THOMAS NORDEGREN, THE A–Z ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE 307 (2002); 
JAMES GRAHAM, VESSELS OF RAGE, ENGINES OF POWER: THE SECRET HISTORY OF ALCOHOLISM 19, 70 
(1994). 
 130. See sources cited supra note 63. 
 131. This inference is drawn from public support for banishing sex-offenders. Damien Cave, 
Roadside Camp for Miami Sex Offenders Leads to Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A14 (“These 
laws are always universally popular . . . . The public loves it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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B.  Strengths of Banishment 
Banishment is less expensive than other forms of punishment, 
especially incarceration.132 While some offenders need to be 
incarcerated because of the severity of their crimes, others merely 
need to be separated from the area and the victim. In this way, 
banishment is similar to incarceration because it also removes the 
offender from his home base for a certain period of time but has the 
additional benefit of conserving valuable state and county 
resources.133 However, because banishment means that the offender 
will be serving his probation or parole outside the area, the 
sentencing court has no way to monitor his progress.134 There are 
also concerns that courts may be imposing banishment where it is not 
appropriate—motivated by the cost savings and efficiency.135 
Another economic benefit of banishment is that the offenders are 
allowed to continue working and therefore can pay child support or 
alimony.136 A fear of losing their only means of financial support—
the offender’s paycheck—often keeps victims in abusive 
situations.137 Therefore, after the incident, that fear can be alleviated 
while still keeping the victim out of danger by utilizing banishment. 
When given a choice between banishment and incarceration, 
offenders often choose banishment.138 In 2006, a teacher convicted of 
abusing one of his students was given the option of serving his 
                                                                                                                 
 132. GA. DEP’T. OF CORR., FY2009 COST OF ADULT OFFENDER SANCTIONS (2010) 
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/pdf/CorrectionsCosts.pdf (reporting that the average annual incarceration 
cost per offender in Georgia is $16,502, compared to $377 per year for an offender on probation, which 
is usually how banishment is implemented). 
 133. See id. 
 134. State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (N.C. 1953). 
 135. Alhusainy v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 914, 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 136. Burke, supra note 9. 
 137. Judith A. Wolfer, Top 10 Myths about Domestic Violence, 42 MD. B.J. 38, 40 (June 2009); 
Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Self Defense, Imminence, and the Battered Woman, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 342, 
348 (2007); LYN SHIPWAY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 10 
(2004). 
 138. Hart v. State, 613 S.E.2d 107, 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the defendant suggested 
banishment in an effort to avoid more jail time); Burke, supra note 63 (“[D]efendants have said that they 
would go to trial before they would agree to be banished, but . . . all backed down.”); see Sager, supra 
note 107. 
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sentence in prison or being exiled to Canada, where his family 
resided.139 The offender chose to leave the country.140 
C.  Focus on Alternative Methods 
As discussed above, protective orders are often used to protect 
victims from their offenders. Although they theoretically accomplish 
the same goal as banishment, these orders suffer from several 
weaknesses that ultimately put the victim at risk. 
First, to obtain a protective order, the victim is usually required to 
petition the court.141 This is dangerous because the offender considers 
it the victim’s fault that he is not allowed to go to his home or see his 
children, increasing feelings of anger and resentment.142 After 
charges are filed, prosecutors can request a “no-contact” order,143 
which separates the victims from the process because the prosecutors, 
not the victims, are the ones requesting the order. 
Second, a protective order is only effective if the consequences 
have a sufficient deterrent influence on the offender.144 For some 
offenders, the order is “just a piece of paper.”145 This is especially the 
case when offenders think they have nothing to lose—as in instances 
when offenders threaten suicide.146 In Terry, the offender was under a 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Lewington & Cheney, supra note 42. 
 140. Id. The sentence led to a public outcry in Canada, and the offender was promptly arrested upon 
entering the country and later deported. Omar El Akkad, Canada Seeks to Expel U.S. Sex Offender, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Oct. 27, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 18647270; Canadian 
Press, Sex Offender Ordered Out but Deportation is Delayed as Former Teacher Launches Appeal, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Dec. 19, 2006, at A9, available at 2006 WLNR 22087085. 
 141. GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-13-3(a) (2003). 
 142. Rosenfeld, supra note 70, at 258 (citing Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: 
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65–66 (1991) (describing “‘retribution assault,’ 
in which a batterer attacks his partner to punish her for seeking protection from him in the courts”)).  
 143. Victim advocacy services may assist with this process. Protection Order Advocacy Program, 
Protection Orders, http://protectionorder.org/?page_id=12 (last visited Mar. 17, 2011). 
 144. Deborah White-Labora, Every Judge’s Nightmare: When a Domestic Violence Case Turns 
Lethal, 31-FALL FAM. ADVOC. 36, 39 (2008).  
 145. In addition, some violations go unpunished, strengthening the offender’s disregard for the 
provisions of the order. Rosenfeld, supra note 70, at 258. The psychological impact of domestic 
violence can also mean that victims do not report violations to law enforcement. Id. at 259 (relating the 
story of a woman who was beaten by her husband and hospitalized, but did not report this as a violation 
of the protective order she had obtained against him; her husband contacted her numerous times in 
violation of the order and eventually murdered her at a battered women’s shelter). 
 146. White-Labora, supra note 144. 
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protective order when he kidnapped and assaulted his ex-wife.147 
During the ordeal, Terry held a pair of scissors to his wife’s chest, 
threatening to kill her and then commit suicide.148 Terry completely 
disregarded the potential repercussions of violating the order because 
of his dangerous obsession149 with his ex-wife. 
Third, in most cases the offender has to get fairly close to the 
victim or the victim’s home or workplace, or engage in harassing 
contact before he can be arrested for violating the order.150 Therefore, 
the victim is already in the zone of danger for a period of time before 
the violation actually occurs.151 This is damaging to the victim’s state 
of mind and sense of well-being, which is what the order is intended 
to protect, in addition to preventing physical violence.152 
D.  Recurring Concepts 
An underlying theme in cases where banishment was inappropriate 
is that there was no connection between the victim and the 
offender.153 For example, in Whitehead v. State,154 the defendant pled 
guilty to armed robbery and aggravated assault against two motel 
patrons.155 Whitehead was sentenced to prison time as well as 
banishment from the judicial circuit upon his release on parole.156 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Terry v. Hamrick, 663 S.E.2d 256, 259 (Ga. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 510 (2008). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. Terry sent his ex-wife numerous letters from jail, stating, “If [I] can’t have [you] nobody 
can,” and also threatening what would happen after he was released, “even if it’s after a hundred years.” 
Brief of Respondent-Appellee at *11, Terry, 663 S.E.2d 256 (No. S08A0170). 
 150. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-95 (2003). 
 151. Additionally, it may be too late to protect the victim once the violation has occurred. JANE 
NUSBAUM FELLER, NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, WORKING WITH THE COURTS 
IN CHILD PROTECTION 29 (1992).  
 152. Susan Keilitz et al., Selected Findings and Implications Drawn From: The Effectiveness of Civil 
Protection Orders reprinted in JEREMY TRAVIS, LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: 
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AM. BAR ASS’N 47, 47–48 (1998). 
 153. See, e.g., Krack v. State, 973 P.2d 100, 105 (AK Ct. App. 1999); Dudley v. State, 496 S.E.2d 
341, 342 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (banishing a former Chief of Police for using pepper spray on arrestees); 
Whitehead v. State, 429 S.E.2d 536, 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (armed robbery of motel patrons). 
 154. Whitehead v. State, 429 S.E.2d 536 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). 
 155. Id. at 537. 
 156. Id. at 538. The defendant also argued that because the written sentence stated “leave the area of 
the Southern Judicial Circuit . . . and do not return into said area at any time,” it constituted banishment 
for an unlimited duration and was therefore unlawful. Id. (emphasis added). When banishment is 
included in a sentence that also requires incarceration, courts have interpreted the banishment to last 
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The victims were strangers to the defendant, and because they were 
staying at a motel, were likely not from the area. Therefore, banishing 
the defendant from the locality did not serve to protect those outside 
the locality.157 In situations like this, separating the offenders from 
the area does not prevent further criminal behavior158 or protect the 
public in general. Especially where crimes such as child 
molestation159 or drug offenses160 are at issue, offenders likely have 
no particular attachment to a specific location. In these situations 
banishment is not appropriate because it does recognize the fact that 
geography has little connection to the crime; it only serves to move 
the crime to another, far away dark alley.161 If the location did not 
contribute to the crime in some way, changing the location will not 
prevent the future crime. 
III.  GEORGIA SHOULD ADOPT A MULTI-FACTOR APPROACH 
Banishment should only be used in the most egregious domestic 
violence cases to protect the victim. Domestic violence involves a 
close social and intimate relationship between the victim and the 
offender.162 In many cases, the offender abuses the victim 
repeatedly.163 The basis for the violence is the offender’s connection 
to the victim, which manifests in extreme jealousy164 and abusive 
                                                                                                                 
only as long as the complete sentence. For example, in Whitehead, the banishment was not “forever” 
because the court held that it was only in effect for the twenty-year sentence, only six years of which 
were to be served on probation. Id.; see also Wyche v. State, 397 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); 
Parrish v. State, 355 S.E.2d 682, 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). 
 157. After committing armed robbery, the defendant was arrested in his car at another motel, possibly 
suggesting that he planned to commit a similar crime. Whitehead, 429 S.E.2d at 537. If Whitehead’s 
preferred targets were motel guests (perhaps because the victims would not remain in the area, reducing 
the chance he would be apprehended), shifting him to another place may only change the scenery for his 
exploits. 
 158. Krack, 973 P.2d at 105. 
 159. See discussion of Krack supra Part II.A. 
 160. See supra Part II.A for discussion of banishment for drug-related crimes. 
 161. Sager, supra note 107, at C8. 
 162. See sources cited supra note 64. 
 163. EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 
45 (3d ed. 2003) (1994) (citing STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN 
FAMILY (1980) (“[A]bout two-thirds of batterers repeat their assault within 1 year, averaging about six 
new assaults.”)). 
 164. DEBORAH LOCKTON & RICHARD WARD, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 17–18 (1997); KATHLEEN 
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incidents. Therefore, removing the offender from the area, and out of 
close proximity of the victim, will prevent violence toward the 
victim, while the offender is of comparatively little danger to the 
citizens in the new area. 
There are several key factors that courts should examine to 
determine whether banishment is appropriate in a situation. The 
absence of a factor would not necessarily mean that banishment 
would be inappropriate because other factors may weigh strongly 
toward the application of banishment.165 
A preliminary concern with banishment is whether the restriction 
is sufficiently connected to the crime. If not, the use of banishment is 
not justified. In People v. Coleman,166 the court affirmed Coleman’s 
banishment from New York City because there was “a sufficient 
nexus between the geographic restriction and victim safety as well as 
recidivism.”167 The defendant was a resident of a different state who 
came to New York because of his connection to the victim.168 
Banishing the defendant from all of New York City was reasonable 
because it gave the victim freedom to change jobs or residences 
without being concerned about the possibility of encountering the 
offender.169 By prohibiting the defendant from entering the city, the 
court was able to hopefully prevent similar confrontations in the 
future.170  
Under the first factor, courts should consider the character and 
length of the parties’ relationship. For example, a long-term 
relationship with multiple abusive incidents would be more 
appropriate for banishment than when an offender was only briefly 
acquainted with the victim and there was a single abusive incident. 
                                                                                                                 
FULLERTON BERNHARD, JEALOUSY: ITS NATURE AND TREATMENT 31 (1986) (“Criminologists 
throughout the world find that jealousy is a leading cause or motive for homicide, wife-battering, and 
domestic violence in general.”). 
 165. See, e.g., infra note 172. 
 166. People v. Coleman, 812 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
 167. Id. at 861 n.6. 
 168. Id. at 858 n.1. 
 169. Id. at 859. 
 170. The court’s reasoning was based in part on the fact that the defendant had previously violated 
multiple protective orders, which demonstrates that another incident would have been likely to occur if 
the defendant was not barred from entering the area where the victim lived and worked. Id. at 860. 
19
Carpino: Banishment in Georgia: A New Approach to Domestic Violence
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:4 
 
822 
When a pattern of abuse is evident in a relationship that course of 
conduct is likely to continue as long as the victim is present.171 
Therefore, removing the offender from the location through 
banishment may prevent future abuse against the victim. 
Second, the court should consider the severity of the crime and the 
degree of the victim’s injuries. The extent of the injury and 
magnitude of the crime should aid the court in determining whether 
the victim is in such danger that banishment would be appropriate. 
However, even when the victim’s physical injuries are fairly minor, 
banishment may still be suitable when other factors are present in the 
scenario.172 
A third factor takes account of whether the victim’s fear of the 
offender circumscribes her life. When a victim has already gone 
through the process to obtain a protective order that failed to protect 
her, she may feel unsafe as she moves through her daily activities. In 
many domestic violence situations, the offenders’ abuse is motivated 
by irrational jealousy,173 which leads them to obsessively stalk their 
victims even after the relationship is over.174 For example, in Terry, 
the defendant continued to send the victim and their son “boxes full” 
of letters from jail, despite numerous requests to stop.175 If the 
victim’s quality of life is severely diminished by the offender, 
banishment would be an appropriate way to restore her freedom and 
prevent further contact. 
Fourth, the court should consider whether the victim previously 
obtained a protective order against the offender. If so, this prior order 
would demonstrate that the first level of punishment was not 
adequate to deter the offender. In Coleman,176 the defendant had 
violated several protective orders—which was one of the reasons that 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, e.g., Terry v. Hamrick, 663 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 510 (2008) 
(upholding banishment where the defendant showed a continuing obsession with the victim, even though 
she suffered only slight physical injuries during the kidnapping). 
 173. MARGI LAIRD MCCUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 7, 11, 59 (2d ed. 2008).  
 174. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 163, at 116 (“[V]ictims . . . related how they were terrorized even 
after restraining orders were imposed and . . . continued to receive harassing mail and calls even after 
the attacker was incarcerated.”). 
 175. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at *8, *9 n.3, Terry, 663 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. 2008) (No. S08A0170). 
 176. People v. Coleman, 812 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
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led the court to affirm his banishment.177 In some domestic violence 
situations the offenders likely will not be given lengthy prison 
sentences but instead will have to complete probation,178 so 
banishment could function as an enhancement to the sentence. 
Another factor is the offender’s past criminal history. If there is no 
prior criminal conduct, it is more likely that the offender’s violent 
tendencies are only expressed in connection with the victim.179 In 
addition, an offender with a criminal record is more likely to repeat 
the abuse180 and therefore poses a greater risk of future danger for the 
victim. By examining the offender’s prior record, the court can more 
accurately determine whether banishment is appropriate.  
A general area of concern is determining whether the victim is in 
such serious danger of being harmed by the offender that banishment 
is reasonable. This could be shown by a trend of escalating 
violence181 or threats made by the offender. The Georgia Court of 
Appeals, in Wilson v. State,182 affirmed banishment where the 
defendant had initially made harassing phone calls to the victim and 
her family, which eventually culminated in threats to kill the victim’s 
child.183 In Alhusainy v. Superior Court,184 the offender was arrested 
for attacking his daughter and was banished from the state of 
California for ten years.185 Alhusainy had a history of abusing his 
family, and his wife had obtained an emergency protective order the 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Id. at 860–61. 
 178. See ELAINE WEISS, FAMILY & FRIENDS’ GUIDE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: HOW TO LISTEN, 
TALK, AND TAKE ACTION WHEN SOMEONE YOU CARE ABOUT IS BEING ABUSED 89 (2003). 
 179. RICHARD L. DAVIS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FACTS AND FALLACIES 19 (1998) (citing a study 
where most of the offenders did not have a prior criminal record, which “‘indicat[ed] [that] . . . [the] 
offenders [were] not deviant outside of the family’”). 
 180. LOCKTON, supra note 164, at 83–84 (1997) (“[A]busers without criminal histories . . . re-abused 
less than those with prior . . . criminal histories. . . . ‘It may be that most male abusers do not have 
criminal records, but the vast majority brought to court by their victims for [protective orders] do.’”). 
 181. SHIPWAY, supra note 137, at 178 (“It is extensively documented that over time domestic abuse 
and violence escalate in both frequency and severity . . . .”). 
 182. Wilson v. State, 260 S.E.2d 527 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).  
 183. Id. at 529–30 (banishing the defendant from Hall County, Georgia as a condition of a suspended 
sentence). 
 184. Alhusainy v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 914(Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 185. Id. at 916–19 (striking the banishment condition because the defendant was required to flee the 
state and leave his sentencing frozen in limbo unless he returned to California and was caught). 
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previous year.186 More recently, the defendant had threatened to kill 
his children and wife if she sought a divorce.187 Though the court 
vacated the sentence,188 Alhusainy’s banishment was appropriate 
because he had repeatedly abused his family and threatened murder, 
placing the victims in a dangerous and volatile situation.189 It was 
also more equitable to make the defendant leave the area because his 
ex-wife was raising their four children there.190 
A.  Case Applications 
Two recent cases demonstrate the potential benefits of the multi-
factor approach proposed in this Note.191 Both have similar factual 
scenarios, but the courts reached different results over the 
appropriateness of banishment. The Wyoming court’s rejection of 
banishment in Crabtree v. State192 represents the majority view that 
banishment is never acceptable.193 However, the Georgia court’s 
affirmance of banishment in Terry v. Hamrick,194 a nearly identical 
case, supports the theory that banishment can be appropriate in 
certain domestic violence situations. 
In Terry, the offender’s ex-wife had previously obtained a 
protective order,195 which Terry violated by kidnapping and 
assaulting her.196 There was no showing that Terry was dangerous in 
any way to other people besides his wife. While the victim suffered 
great emotional harm when the defendant abducted her,197 she 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Id. at 916. 
 187. Id. 
 188. However, the court overturned the banishment on procedural grounds. Id. at 919 (noting also that 
public policy prohibits banishment from the entire state). The trial court had instructed the defendant to 
leave the state immediately (prior to his sentencing hearing) and prohibited him from re-entering 
California. Id. at 916–17. Because he was required to vacate the area prior to sentencing, he was 
essentially forced to become a fugitive from justice, which led the court to issue a bench warrant for his 
arrest. Id. The court held that this scenario was improper and overturned the condition. Id. at 917. 
 189. Id. at 916.  
 190. See Alhusainy v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 914(Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 191. See discussion supra Part III. 
 192. Crabtree v. State, 112 P.3d 618 (Wyo. 2005). 
 193. See supra notes 6–8. 
 194. Terry v. Hamrick, 663 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 510 (2008). 
 195. Id. at 259.  
 196. Id. 
 197. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at *6, *8, Terry, 663 S.E.2d 256 (No. S08A0170). 
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suffered only minor physical injuries,198 so a long prison term would 
have been unlikely.199 The court’s goal here should be to protect the 
victim while ensuring that the defendant receives a sentence 
proportionate to the crime—a sentence that is tailored to the situation 
involved. The unique feature of this case was that Terry was banished 
from most of Georgia,200 but the court considered the victim’s 
freedom to live her life without fear, and still found the condition 
reasonable.201 Through his actions, Terry revealed that his ex-wife 
would not be adequately protected by a protective order. Here the 
factor approach establishes that banishment was appropriately used as 
the next level of severity after a protective order. 
In Crabtree,202 the defendant was convicted of felony family 
violence battery and banished from Natrona County, Wyoming.203 
The defendant and the victim had been romantically involved for four 
years, and the relationship was often violent.204 Terry and his ex-wife 
had a similarly long and tumultuous history.205 As in Terry, the 
length and negative character of the relationship supports the use of 
banishment under the first factor. 
During the attack the defendant pushed the victim down and bit her 
several times, but apparently the victim did not suffer any serious 
physical injury.206 This incident was the defendant’s third conviction 
of battery against a household member, which elevated the charge to 
a felony.207 The Terry victim suffered similarly minor physical 
injuries,208 but banishment was appropriate because the other factors 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Id. at *10.  
 199. See WEISS, supra note 178 (“[L]ess than two percent of all abusers ever serve jail time.”); Lisa 
G. Lerman & Naomi R. Cahn, Legal Issues in Violence Toward Adults in  CASE STUDIES IN FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 97 (Robert T. Ammerman & Michel Hersen eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
 200. Terry, 663 S.E.2d at 258 (noting banishment from all but one Georgia county). 
 201. Id. at 259; see Brief of Respondent-Appellee at *9, *10, Terry, 663 S.E.2d 256 (No. S08A0170). 
 202. Crabtree v. State, 112 P.3d 618 (Wyo. 2005). 
 203. Id. at 620.  
 204. Id. at 619. 
 205. Terry, 663 S.E.2d at 259 (“[F]or years Terry had followed a violent course of conduct toward his 
ex-wife.”). 
 206. See Crabtree, 112 P.3d at 619. 
 207. Id. at 619. 
 208. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at *10, Terry, 663 S.E.2d 256 (No. S08A0170). 
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in the analysis support its application. Here the totality of the 
circumstances leads to the same result. 
Crabtree had previously been arrested for attacking the victim and 
was under a protective order when the abuse at issue occurred.209 The 
court noted that the most recent attack was motivated by the 
defendant’s anger with the victim regarding his related legal 
problems.210 By violating the order and physically abusing his 
girlfriend, the defendant showed the court that the customary 
protective measures implemented in such cases would not deter 
future violence. As the court stated in Terry, “[T]he very facts of this 
case show the inefficacy of such orders as applied to [the 
defendant].”211 This conduct supported use of banishment under the 
second factor in both cases. There is little detail in the Crabtree case 
regarding the victim’s fear of the defendant, but she had applied for a 
protective order,212 which implies a degree of apprehension under the 
third factor.  
Banishment should not replace incarceration, but banishment 
should be used instead when incapacitation is not (or is no longer) 
necessary to punish the offender and protect the public. 
GOING FORWARD 
Banishment has a long history in the United States and throughout 
the world.213 Although the majority of courts prohibit its use, 
banishment retains value as a punitive tool in certain situations, 
particularly where the offender’s relationship to the victim is what 
drives the crime. In cases like those described in the previous 
section,214 standard criminal justice methods have been ineffective, as 
evidenced by the offenders’ violations of protective orders. When 
typical approaches are unsuccessful, courts should be open to 
                                                                                                                 
 209. Crabtree, 112 P.3d at 619. 
 210. Id. at, 619. 
 211. Terry, 663 S.E.2d at 259. 
 212. Crabtree, 112 P.3d at 619. 
 213. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 214. E.g., Terry, 663 S.E.2d 256; Crabtree, 112 P.3d 618. 
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adopting different tactics. Georgia courts are currently pursuing this 
approach through the use of banishment.215 
Banishment should be limited to a certain category of domestic 
violence cases216 through use of a multi-factor approach, which 
would reduce the negative ramifications of banishment that are 
prevalent when it is applied indiscriminately. The factors include: the 
character and length of the parties’ relationship, the severity of the 
crime as well as the degree of the victim’s injuries, how the victim’s 
fear of the offender circumscribes her life, and lastly, whether the 
victim previously obtained a protective order against the offender. 
The unique attributes of domestic violence render it an ideal area 
for applying banishment, and by utilizing this multi-factor approach, 
Georgia courts can limit its use to the most egregious cases, in which 
the victim is at a significant risk of future attack. 
                                                                                                                 
 215. See supra note 2. 
 216. For example, banishment should be limited to only the most egregious repeat domestic violence 
cases. E.g., Terry, 663 S.E.2d 256. 
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